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Some alternative perspectives on macroeconomic theory  
And some policy implications
1 
By William  R White 
Introduction 
Everyone is painfully aware that we have just gone through a major economic and financial 
crisis  which  touched  all  parts  of  the  global  economy.  Output  levels  fell  sharply  and 
unemployment  and  poverty  rose  commensurately.  Many  financial  markets  became 
dysfunctional  and  important  financial  institutions  had  to  be  merged  or  recapitalized  by 
governments. Nor is it at all clear that the current “green shoots” of recovery will not be 
followed by yet another serious downturn. And the fact that an unprecedented easing of 
monetary and fiscal stimulus had less than expected effects on growth in some countries 
raises question about the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies looking forward. Against 
this background, one piece of good news is that the crisis has prompted some economists to 
rethink what they believe about how the economy works. Hopefully, such reflections will 
eventually lead to improvements in both macroeconomic analysis and policy prescriptions.  
In the midst of the crisis, while visiting the London School of Economics, Queen Elizabeth ll 
asked why the economics profession had failed to see it coming. In fact, most economists did 
not  forecast  the  coming  turbulence.  This  set  includes  virtually  all  academic  economists, 
those  presenting  the  official  views  of  the  IMF  and  OECD,  and  those  representing  most 
national governments.  For the record, however, a few did give advance warnings. They told  
“stories” about what they felt was going wrong, based on insights mostly drawn from pre 
War ll economists. The more interesting question is why no one, including policymakers, was 
inclined to take those warnings seriously.  
Perhaps the most fundamental reason was that, in the run up to the crisis, many private 
sector people (particularly those in the financial markets) were making huge sums of money. 
They were more inclined to attribute this to cleverness than to sharp increases in risk taking. 
In the public sector, and particularly in central banking circles, there was a wide spread 
conviction that, with inflation under control, nothing could go seriously wrong in the global 
economy. Underlying both sets of beliefs seemed to be something in human nature that says 
“Never  look  a  gift  horse  in  the  mouth”.  Another,  albeit  less  important,  reason  was  the 
repeated assertion that we had entered permanently a “New Era” of “Great Moderation”. 
This gave further support to the inherent optimism.  
                                                           
1 An initial version of this paper was presented at a meeting of the Euro50 group in Paris on 20 November, 
2009. It has benefitted from comments by David Laidler and Axel Leijonhufvud, neither of whom necessarily 
agree with all of its contents.  2 
   
But  a  third  reason,  the  subject  of  this  lecture,  is  that  the  prevailing  macroeconomic 
frameworks simply allowed no room for crises of the sort we are currently experiencing. As 
Keynes once pointed out, this framework question is fundamental.  
“The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they 
are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by 
little else.” 
2 
Absent an analytical framework which included the possibility of crises and deep economic 
slumps, it is not surprising that the crisis was not commonly anticipated. Nor is it surprising 
that no policy efforts were made to prevent the crisis from happening. Moreover, absent 
any fears of crisis, few ex ante preparations were made to help improve crisis management 
(eg adequate deposit insurance, special legislation for the insolvency of financial institutions, 
etc.). Further, ex post crisis management was also inadequate in that each stage of the 
downturn was treated as the last, and recovery was constantly said to be imminent. By way 
of  example,  problems  in  the  banking  sector  were  initially  treated  as  having  to  do  with 
liquidity rather than solvency, and it was generally assumed that traditional Keynesian policy 
responses would suffice to restore full employment.  
Finally with respect to recent crisis management, there has been inadequate appreciation to 
date of the extent to which our policies have created a form of “moral hazard”. All of the 
policies implemented over the last few years, however necessary in the near term, have 
significant down sides over a longer term horizon.  Not only do they make future problems 
both more likely and more serious, but they also reduce the effectiveness of similar policies 
that  might  become  required  in  the  future.  In  fact,  recent  policy  measures  only  extend 
further an almost continuous expansion of the public safety net over the last two decades at 
least
3.  Evidently,  the  concept  of  a  series  of  “bubbles”,  reflecting  in  part  the  actions  of 
policymakers themselves, is not easy to model in any formal fashion. Perhaps as a result, 
such concepts are not part of mainstream thinking about policy issues.  
Evidently, simply improving our analytical frameworks will not be sufficient to avoid future 
crises. Nevertheless, such a reevaluation is necessary. There are many dead ends from which 
to escape, but there are also many promising strands of thought yet to be pursued. 
It  will  be  contended  in  this  paper  that  the  two  workhorses  of  post  World  War  ll 
macroeconomics have serious practical deficiencies. These workhorses are referred to here 
as  Modern  Macroeconomics  (made up of  the New  Classical  and  New  Keynesian  models 
favored  by  academics)  and  Applied  Keynesian  Models  (  generally  empirically  estimated 
IS/LM models of the type still favored by policymakers and other applied economists). The 
former models rule out crises and deep slumps by assumption. The latter set of models 
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underestimate the contributions made to deep slumps by developments occurring in the 
upswing.  Thus,  they  overestimate  the  capacity  of  Keynesian  policies  to  moderate  deep 
slumps when they do occur
4. In effect, they also rule out deep slumps, but on the basis of a 
different set of assumptions. Taken together, these points also imply a greater need to lean 
against the upswings of credit cycles rather than to simply try to clean up afterwards
5. 
 To  remedy  these  deficiencies,  it  will  be  argued  here  that  a  new  analytical  synthesis  is 
required. The building blocks of such a synthesis would be an increased focus on credit, 
stocks rather than flows (balance sheets), the possibility of stock “imbalances” (in particular 
excessive levels of debt), and the process of transition into crisis.  In effect, the work of 
Keynes  needs  to  be  complemented  by  additional  insights  from  the  Austrian  School  of 
Economics, and still others  from the work of Hyman Minsky. An increased emphasis on 
credit and the evolving balance sheets of both corporations and households would embellish 
our  understanding  of  the  demand  side  of  the  economy,  both  in  the  upswing  and  the 
downswing. Certain Austrian insights (recognizing in particular the importance of stocks of 
physical capital) would do the same for the supply side. The writings of Minsky are also 
important in that they draw attention to the implications of a  complex financial system 
(experiencing both credit risk and liquidity risk) for the functioning of the economy as a 
whole.   
As  described,  this  synthesis  might  seem  little  more  than  a  call  for  an  improved 
understanding  of  each  of  the  IS,  AS  and  LM  functions  in  standard  Keynesian  models. 
However, what is also required is a greater understanding of the dynamics of economies that 
eventually culminate in their being seriously out of equilibrium
6. The current crisis, as well as 
many others in history
7, indicates that economies can be far from self- equilibrating, both on 
the  up-side  and  the  down-side.  Of  particular  importance  today,  forces  can  arise  that 
reinforce the disequilibrium, resulting in high rates of unemployment that last for many 
years.  If  this  is  the  case,  the  obvious  next  question  is  what  public  policies  might  best 
contribute to restoring equilibrium on a sustainable rather than just a temporary basis? The 
insights drawn from the analysis of stocks, the Austrians and Minsky indicate that simple 
demand side stimulus might not provide a lasting solution to such problems. 
Two “Workhorses” and their shortcomings 
In  modern  academic  thinking,  New  Classical  and  New  Keynesian  models  of  the  macro 
economy became dominant and competing paradigms. However, in recent years, a kind of 
synthesis has been forged which has led to the popularity of Dynamic Stochastic General 
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Equilibrium models of the economy, even among researchers at leading central banks. All of 
these  models  (genetically  referred  to  here  as  Modern  Macroeconomics)  have  as  their 
primary assumption that the economy has self equilibrating properties in the face of shocks. 
A second, basic, assumption is that all economic actors have rational expectations which 
coordinate actions inter temporally. This assumption also ensures that price expectations 
will be anchored in the policy objectives asserted by central banks. 
The  purest  form  of  such  models  is  found  in  the  New  Classical  (or  real  business  cycle) 
tradition. Here there are no frictions in the economy. All prices adjust instantaneously to 
clear all markets, ensuring in particular that there can be no involuntary unemployment. 
New Keynesian models reintroduce the idea (a classical notion but one often attributed to 
Keynes)  that  wage  and  price  rigidities  (and  possibly  other  “frictions”)  can  cause 
unemployment  to  rise  in  the  face  of  economic  shocks,  but  this  is  purely  a  temporary 
phenomenon.  The  synthesis  of  these  views,  now  referred  to  as  the  New  Neoclassical 
Synthesis, effectively involved the New Keynesians adopting the modeling methodologies of 
the  New  Classical  school,  and  the  New  Classical  School  accepting  certain  “frictions”  as 
realities.  
Needless to say, the recent crisis has not been highly supportive of New Classical models  
based  on  the  assumption  that  rapidly  adjusting  prices  will  quickly  reestablish  equality 
between  demand  and  supply,  particularly  of  labour.  This  assumption  seems  increasingly 
inconsistent with observed increases in unemployment
8 and the sharp slump in output that 
affected almost all of the global economy. Moreover, even prior to the recent downturn, 
these models were already under attack on both theoretical and empirical grounds
9.  As for 
New Keynesian attempts to date to introduce “frictions” into the economy, their influence 
also seems inadequate to explain the dramatic events still unfolding. Indeed, in addition to 
sticky wages, there are a whole host of other prices (eg many exchange rates, interest rates 
both short and long, and the price of energy) that are not in fact free to adjust to market 
pressures. Rather, they have been significantly influenced by governments pursuing a variety 
of distributional and other objectives. This interference may, in turn, have inclined the global 
economy more towards instability than stability.
10   
Nor has the crisis been kind to the assumption of rational expectations which underlies both 
sets of models.  Already under attack on philosophical grounds
11 (what exactly does it mean 
to be rational?) the preceding rapid rise and subsequent collapse of a wide range of asset 
prices hardly seemed consistent with a rational pricing process related to underlying values. 
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Rather,  it  appeared  as  if  expectations  in  many  markets  were  based  largely  on  the 
extrapolation  of  past  developments.  This  led  to  price  levels  that  eventually  proved 
“unsustainable” as the fundamentals eventually reasserted themselves. Moreover, if it can 
be contended that momentum rather than rationality drove asset prices, this also raises the 
possibility that a similar process might be driving inflationary expectations. There is in fact 
not a very great deal of empirical support for the assertion that low inflationary expectations 
have been  anchored in the stated objectives of central bankers (credibility) rather than the 
experience of low inflation (good luck) in recent years.
12 
Finally, it needs to be noted that, in models of this sort, there is continuous coordination 
between individual economic agents (both at a moment in time and across time) through 
the  assumed  existence  of  representative  agents  and  rational  expectations.  But  such 
assumptions have evident practical shortcomings. First, there is no need for either money or 
a  financial  system.  To  quote  Charles  Bean  (2009),  against  the  backdrop  of  continuing  
problems in the financial sector,   
“the fact that financial intermediation plays a negligible role in Mike Woolford’s magisterial 
state of the art opus, Interest and Prices, speaks volumes” 
Further, such assumptions imply that exchange obligations are always honored, whether at a 
moment in time, or across time.  In fact, what characterizes the real world in crisis is a 
systematic  failure  to  honor  such  obligations.  In  the  private  sector,  bankruptcies  and 
workouts are common in both the financial and non financial sectors. In extremis, the public 
sector agrees to meet these obligations in nominal terms but often fails to meet them in real 
terms as it turns to inflation to erode values
13.  
In  short,  this  crisis  (as  well  as  earlier  crises)  provides  evidence  that  the  simplifying 
assumptions on which much of Modern Macroeconomics is based are not very useful in 
explaining real world developments. While progress in resolving practical problems can be 
made by proceeding down this path, it seems likely to take a very long time.  
It would be tempting to say that it was the use of these kinds of models by policymakers that 
led them astray and contributed to our current difficulties. Unfortunately, there is very little 
evidence that these modern  academic theories had much impact on the way that most 
central bankers have used their policy instruments. Allen Blinder, both a highly respected 
central banker and academic has written convincingly on this
14. Rather, most senior policy 
makers continued to rely on Applied Keynesian Models. However, since these models also 
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failed  to  provide  advance  warning  of  building  problems,  the  specific  nature  of  their  
shortcomings must also be considered. 
One of the great accomplishments of Keynes’ General Theory was that it provided a general 
equilibrium  model  capable  of  explaining  the  simultaneous  determination  of  aggregate 
output, interest rates and (later) prices and inflation. In contrast to classical theory, increases 
in saving would not (via lower interest rates) ensure that investment rose commensurately 
to maintain full employment. Rather, aggregate demand (driving income and production) 
might  well  fall  significantly  in  the  process  of  ensuring  equality  between  saving  and 
investment.  Moreover, if there was one thing that preoccupied Keynes, at least in “The 
General Theory”, it was the reality of, and the need for a policy response to, deep and lasting 
slumps that demonstrated the fundamental inadequacy of the self equilibrating tendencies 
in the economy. In this regard, Keynes borrowed from Wicksell the idea that a monetary 
economy was fundamentally different from a barter economy, and that certain processes 
(the “paradox of saving” and “accelerator” effects, for example) amplified deviations from 
full employment equilibrium rather than moderating them.   
 Shortly after the publication of the General Theory, Keynes’s view of the world (which was 
always  hard  to  interpret)  was  given  a  much  more  concrete  form  in  the  IS/LM  model 
suggested  by  Sir  John  Hicks.  Unfortunately,  this  mathematically  tractable  model  had  to 
ignore  issues  that  were  thought  by  some  to  be  the  essence  of  Keynes’  thought
15. 
Nevertheless, this simplified model proved extremely popular and many large empirically 
estimated macroeconomic models were subsequently built upon this framework. Indeed, a 
more recent development (made possible by advances in technology) was the imposition on 
such models of such medium term properties as a return to full employment from whatever 
starting position. Evidently, this implied a significant deviation from the original Keynesian 
concern about deep slumps requiring government interventions.  
It  is  important  to  note  that  Applied  Keynesian  Models  have  never  been  any  good  at 
forecasting turning points in the economy, and they were particularly caught out by the 
current  downturn.  This  is  indeed  a  fundamental  shortcoming,  since  we  hardly  need 
expensive models to assert that the future will be pretty much like the past.  Apparently 
Keynes himself
16 was profoundly skeptical about the usefulness of such models, which would 
not  be  surprising  if  he  felt  that  their  construction  ignored  some  of  his  most  important 
insights.  Expectations, in particular, were thought by Keynes to influence fundamentally all 
forms of economic behavior. Moreover, given the complexity of the economy, Keynes felt 
the future was essentially uncertain. Evidently, such a viewpoint has nothing in common 
with  rational expectations.  Faced  with  such uncertainty,  economic  behavior  tends to be 
                                                           
15 See in particular Leihonhufvud (1968). 
16 Don Patinkin has documented an exchange of letters between Keynes and Hicks, as well as Keynes‘ views on 
the seminal econometric work of Tinbergen.  7 
   
guided  in  large  part  by  heuristic  devices  and  raw  emotion  (“animal  spirits”)  which  can 
produce highly non-linear outcomes, including deep slumps.  
Put another way, Keynes might have agreed that the IS/LM model captured his views in 
terms of functional forms, but he likely also felt that it could not be estimated. If there was 
one  thing  that  would  characterize  the  future,  it  would  not  be  the  average  of  past 
observations. And to this early criticism of Applied Keynesian Models must be added the 
later “Lucas critique”, as well as the reality of ongoing and massive structural change in the 
economy which violates the common working assumption of parametric stability in such 
models
17.  
Finally, it is worth noting that Applied Keynesian models rarely have well developed financial 
sectors.  While the money supply can have an influence on spending, it is generally only to 
the  degree  that  increases  in  the  money  supply  reduce  interest  rates,  and  these  affect 
spending in turn through a variety of channels
18. Indeed, in most of these applied models, 
money and credit have disappeared entirely. They have been replaced by the policy rate, 
under the influence of the central bank, which is typically guided by something like a Taylor 
rule. Evidently, without significant detail in the financial sector, the richness of the two way 
interactions between the health of the real economy and that of the financial system must 
be almost entirely missing.   
To  summarize,  all  of  the  formal  models  in  common  use  seem  to  have  significant 
shortcomings. Modern Macroeconomic models are based on many simplifying assumptions, 
limiting their usefulness to policy makers. Applied Keynesian Models also have deficiencies, 
contributing to their incapacity to forecast crises and to accurately gauge the effectiveness 
of the policy response. One reason could be that some excluded aspects of Keynes’ thought 
are in fact important for understanding how the economy really works. Another possible 
reason is that all of the above models pay inadequate attention to credit, to stocks and 
balance sheets (particularly of the corporate and household sectors) and to the possibility of 
“imbalances” which both lead to crises and subsequently impede recovery.  
  
                                                           
17 The Lucas critique essentially says that structural relationships depend on policy regimes, and that changes in 
regime will change structure. The determination of a growing number of central banks to maintain stable prices 
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globalisation, particularly on the demand and supply of goods and services. As well, within the financial sector, 
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these massive changes in the real, monetary and financial sectors with the assumption of parametric stability.   
18 The formulation of the “broad credit” channel, through which monetary policy affects asset values and thus 
the collateral available to support loans (affecting the risk premium charged to borrowers), was an important 
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 Credit, Stocks, “Imbalances” and Crises 
All  of  the  models  considered  above  pay  limited  or  no  attention  to  credit  aggregates. 
Moreover,  they  focus  on  the  determinants  of  the  flow  of  expenditures  (ie  aggregate 
demand) in an economy during a given time period, and allow for demand being either 
excessive
19 or deficient.  However, being essentially one period flow models, stocks that 
build up over time have only a peripheral and gradual influence on people’s behavior. Put 
another way, balance sheet considerations play virtually no role either in explaining crises or 
shaping the nature of the recovery. .   
In contrast to this one period framework, Austrian theory focuses on the creation of money 
and credit by the financial system, and how this leads to cumulative “malinvestments” over 
many periods
20. In short, the Austrian approach has more to do with stocks than flows, and 
focuses  more  on  the  processes  leading  to  crises  than  how  to  recover  from  them.  For 
Austrians, “malinvestments” ultimately come down to investments in real capital that will 
not in the end be profitable, and contracts that will not be honored. Such credit driven 
processes were expected to implode eventually in the form of an economic crisis of some 
sort. On the one hand, the crisis might result in a sharp fall in output and outright deflation. 
On the other hand, if monetary measures were used vigorously enough in response, the end 
result might be inflation or even hyperinflation. Recall that much of this theorizing was being 
done  against  the  background  of  WW1  German  debt  reparations  and  the  post  war 
hyperinflation in central Europe.  
If these Austrian insights provide an important starting point for further analysis, they fall 
well  short  of  a  fully  articulated  description  of  how  balance  sheet  effects  (including  non 
monetary financial assets and liabilities) can have an impact on economic behavior.  Koo 
(2009) advances the argument one step further
21 by documenting how high corporate debt 
levels in Japan led to a decade long collapse in investment as corporations focused on debt 
repayment.  Still  another  step  in  that  direction  has  been  provided  by  the  Bank  for 
International Settlements (BIS) which, for over a decade, has focused on the more general 
concept  of  “imbalances”.
22  By  this  is  meant  observations  of  significant  and  sustained 
deviations  of  economic  variables  (both  financial  and  economic)  from  levels  that  seem 
justifiable in terms of either historical norms or underlying changes in fundamentals. Such 
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variables would include asset prices, debt levels, spending patterns (saving and investment 
behavior in particular), trade imbalances and excessive investments in particular sectors that 
in the end threaten profitability . All of these affect balance sheets in one form or another, 
and not only the balance sheets of borrowers but also those of lenders. The underlying 
assumption was that such deviations (as in Austrian theory) were driven by credit expansion 
and  would  eventually  collapse.  Moreover,  their  lingering  effects  would  exert  significant 
restraint on the recovery path as well.  
To give such thoughts a  modern frame of reference, the BIS repeatedly contended that 
unusually rapid monetary and credit growth over the last decade or so threatened a variety 
of unpleasant outcomes. On the one hand, an inflationary upsurge was though a probable 
outcome as recently as the summer of 2008. On the other hand, concerns were also being 
raised about growing “imbalances”. The rapid rate of monetary and credit expansion was 
said to have led to asset price increases that seemed to have little to do with fundamentals. 
Further, it had also led to spending behavior that was well outside historical norms. For 
example, the household saving rate in many English speaking countries fell to zero or even 
below, even as the ratio of investment to GDP in China rose to almost 50 percent. The 
danger was always that these “imbalances” would revert respectively to more justifiable and 
more normal levels. Perhaps most importantly, debt levels would reach heights judged to be 
unsustainable and spending would be reined back in turn. Overextended bankers would no 
longer wish to lend and debtors would no longer wish to borrow.  
Over  the  last  two  years  we  have  seen  something  of  this  nature.  Both  asset  prices  and 
consumer  spending  in  the  United  States,  the  United  Kingdom  and  a  number  of  other 
countries seem to be reverting to more normal levels.  As rates of household saving have 
risen in an effort to pay down debt, spending and the economy have slowed. The fact that 
the stock of outstanding durable goods and houses has in many cases expanded enormously 
continues to put downward pressure on the price of such goods, leading to further balance 
sheet  deterioration.  Household  bankruptcies  have  risen  sharply  and  more  are  expected. 
Moreover,  these  reversions  have  also  inflicted  enormous  damage  on  the  financial 
institutions that extended the credit in the first place. These developments are at the heart 
of the current global slowdown, although they have had (thus far at least) the benefit of 
reducing  the  earlier  inflationary  pressures.  Looking  forward  from  this  perspective,  the 
continued and unprecedented credit-fuelled growth of fixed investment in China would have 
to be seen more as a danger signal than a sign of renewed sustainable growth.  
It is particularly important to note that the initial Austrian insight (“malinvestment”) goes 
beyond  the  effects of  credit  on  various  components  of  demand.  It  assumes  that  supply 
responds. Mistaken spending decisions result in stocks of unprofitable (for corporations) or 
undesired (for households) stocks of investment/durable goods that will take a significant 
time to depreciate. To again put this in a current perspective, many industries which have 10 
   
expanded sharply in response to high demand are now  “too big” and must shrink. Such 
industries  at  the  global  level  would  include  financial  services,  car  production,  wholesale 
distribution  (particularly  global  supply  networks),  construction,  and  (for  a  time  at  least) 
many  other  intermediate  and  primary  inputs  such  as  steel,  aluminum  and  cement. 
Moreover, with many  production facilities in Asia now geared up to sell to foreigners, who 
no  longer  have  the  means  to  pay  (nor  the  willingness  to  borrow  further),  a  major 
geographical reallocation of production facilities also seems inevitable.   
During  the  significant  time  that  all  this  restructuring  will  take,  the  structural  rate  of 
unemployment  will  be  higher  and  the  level  of  potential  will  be  lower.  Moreover,  these 
effects on potential will come on top of the more traditional effects of downturns leading to  
lower investment (sometimes suppressed by tighter credit conditions) and hysteresis in the 
labor market
23. This implies that all policies to expand aggregate demand could stimulate 
inflationary pressures sooner than some might expect. Given that some of these policies 
(e.g. Quantititative and Credit Easing) are themselves unprecedented, and their effects on 
demand  commensurately  uncertain
24,  the  added  uncertainty  generated  by  shifts  in 
aggregate  supply  raises  the  likelihood  of  policy  mistakes  that  might  culminate  in  either 
inflation or deflation. 
If the treatment of “imbalances” in popular macroeconomic analysis needs to be improved, 
so too does the treatment of the financial sector. The popular shorthand for our current 
difficulties  is  the  “global  financial  crisis”,  which  suggests  that  financial  issues  are  being 
increasingly  recognized  as  important
25.  Admittedly,  it  has  always  been  understood  that 
bankers create money and credit. Indeed, this was seen (by the Austrians at least) as being 
at the heart of the crises which emerge from time to time in capitalist societies. However, 
even in that literature, problems within the financial sector and negative feedback effects 
from a wounded financial sector to the real economy are hardly mentioned. Irving Fisher 
                                                           
23 See Cerra and Saxena (2008) 
24 The level of demand going forward will, in any event, be extremely uncertain. In particular, it will depend on 
household spending decisions subject to unprecedented levels of debt in many countries, sharp variations in 
asset prices, and a degree of tightening of credit conditions that will depend on the health of the financial 
system. Putting all these risks together might well imply that we have entered the realm of Knightian 
uncertainty when it comes to policy formulation.  
25 The popular shorthand that says we are currently facing a “financial crisis” could also imply that some 
deficiency in the operation of the financial sector provides a full explanation of what has gone wrong.  This 
latter extension would, in fact, constitute a serious misperception. As will be discussed further below, the crisis 
has deep roots in the interactions between the real and financial sectors. It has not been caused by the 
financial sector alone. This misperception is due, perhaps, to the fact that the catalyst for the crisis (rather than 
its cause) was the set of difficulties which arose in the market for subprime mortgages in the United States. 
This perception might also have been supported by the associated popular concern that weakness in the 
financial system could feed back on the real economy through tighter credit conditions.  Perhaps an even more 
important reason for the focus on financial sector problems is the fact that the public always needs someone to 
blame in times of crisis. This time it has proved convenient to blame the financial sector in general, and bankers 
in particular.  11 
   
(1936) provided another early attempt to analyze such interactive processes. Against the 
background of thousands of bank failures in the United States in the early 1930’s, he spoke 
of successive stages of lending with ever easier credit conditions
26. In the end, this laxity 
threatened the banks themselves, their willingness to extend further credit, and the capacity 
of the economy to recover.    
For a fuller evaluation of the dynamics of such financial processes, however, we need to turn 
to Hyman Minsky whose “Financial Instability Hypothesis takes banking seriously as a profit 
making activity”
27. Like Fisher, Minsky spoke of stages of credit growth, with the horizon of 
the credit getting shorter at each stage. The process would culminate in what was essentially 
Ponzi finance, when loans at the last stage of the boom would be used to pay the interest on 
previous loans. Moreover, Minsky felt that an evolution towards lower and lower lending 
standards was inevitable.  
“over periods of prolonged prosperity, the economy transits from financial relations 
that  make  for  a  stable  system  to  financial  relations    that  make  for  an  unstable 
system”  
Fundamentally, for Minsky, stability breeds instability. The process of credit creation ends at 
a moment, impossible to predict in advance but catalyzed by some external event, when 
creditors  suddenly  admit  to  their  past  excesses.  They  naturally  focus  first  on  their  own 
exposures,  but then  almost  instantaneously  on  what  they  assume  to  be  the  even  more 
imprudent behavior of others.  At this “Minsky moment” the downward phase of the credit 
cycle begins, with important implications for the real economy. Note, moreover, that while it 
looks like a liquidity crisis, the underlying reason for the drying up of credit is (for Minsky) 
deep concerns about the insolvency of counterparties, including other banks. 
Consider the market’s reaction to the decision by BNP in August 2007 to freeze withdrawals 
from  three  of  their  off  balance  sheet  vehicles.  Consider  also  the  market’s  subsequent 
reaction to the unexpected failure of Lehman brothers. In effect, the interbank term market 
dried up completely, and almost instantaneously, as did many other markets including those 
for asset backed commercial paper and virtually all securitized products. There would then 
seem to be a lot in the work of Minsky that could be relevant to our current problems. One 
important implication of this interpretation of events is that the crisis should ideally have 
been treated as a solvency (rather than just a liquidity) problem to begin with. Evidently, 
absent adequate legal mechanisms this was not possible in practice. This issue is returned to 
below.  
 
                                                           
26 The last of these he speaks of as aiding ”speculation and outright fraud“ . That this is a common observation 
in the late stages of major credit booms is attested to by Kindelberger and Aliber (2005) who devote a whole 
chapter to such events in past cycles. In this historical context at least, Bernie Madoff did not act alone.  
27 Minsky (1992). 12 
   
 
Some Suggestions for Macroeconomic Theory 
What do the above considerations seem to imply for the future of macroeconomic theory? 
The simplifying assumptions of the New Classical and New Keynesian models do not make 
them obvious candidates for near term guidance as to how best to conduct macroeconomic 
policies. As Mankiw (2006) describes it, theirs is the work of “scientists” and not “engineers”. 
The practical payoff could take decades, if ever. 
As a practical matter, we might begin by trying to improve the analytical models currently 
used by policymakers. The first challenge might then be to try to reintroduce some elements 
of the “Economics of Keynes” that have thus far been excluded from such models.
28  In 
particular, what are the implications for the reestablishment of full employment (after a 
shock) of heterogeneous economic agents having different appetites for risk,  expectations 
and access to information, and also being subject to a variety of constraints
29. At a minimum, 
an improved Keynesian approach would recognize the essential fuzziness and uncertainties 
implicit in the ”animal spirits” that drive the main functional forms of the models based on 
“Keynesian Economics”.  
This  latter  point  implies  in  turn  being  considerably  more  skeptical  about  the  forecasts 
thrown up by the currently used empirical models of this type.  Indeed, experience of very 
large forecast errors at turning points, not least by the IMF, OECD and other official bodies, 
has contributed to a trend evident in most forecasting shops for many years.  Conscious of 
the potential shortcomings of individual models, many institutions have already begun to 
maintain a variety of such models. Judgments about policy requirements are then based on 
an overview of them all, plus whatever intuition experienced policy makers are prone to add 
in. This approach is often spoken of as a desirable blend of “art and science”. However, if all 
the models being considered suffer from essentially the same analytical flaws, the “science” 
component would hardly seem to deserve such a designation.      
But there are other challenges to the conventional way of doing things as well.  How can we 
blend into this improved Keynesian framework some of the insights of Austrian theory, in 
particular concerns about “imbalances” that both lead to crisis and impede recovery?  Under 
normal  circumstances,  using  a  Keynesian  framework  straightforwardly  to  project  output 
gaps and inflationary tendencies might seem quite satisfactory. For example, earlier in this 
decade, such a framework seemed to provide an adequate explanation for the simultaneous 
                                                           
28 Leijonhufvud (1968) in the title of his book distinguishes between “Keynesian economics and the Economics 
of Keynes”. The former he considers to be the popular version of Keynesianism discussed above, while the 
latter is what Leijonhufvud contends Keynes actually believed. 
29 Among these would be included sticky nominal wages, the zero lower bound for nominal interest rates, and 
financial contracts written in nominal terms. In the event of falling prices and squeezed profit margins, all of 
these might lead to an aggravation of the severity of downturns arising from whatever cause.  13 
   
observation of rapid growth, falling inflation and very low real interest rates
30 in the global 
economy.  However,  beneath  this  calm  surface,  “imbalances”  were  building  up  that 
eventually culminated in the current crisis
31. The future macroeconomic research agenda 
must find ways to identify and react to these cumulative pressures. Fortunately, there has 
already been a significant amount of work done in the area of identification, and some 
promising areas for further progress have been suggested.
32   
One tendency that must be resisted is to see this work on imbalances as being related solely 
to “financial stability”. In part, this tendency is related to the misconception noted above 
that our current problems have been initiated by and are limited to the financial sector.  
Rather, an important dimension of the Austrian interpretation of the current set of problems 
is that excessive credit and monetary creation can lead to imbalances outside the financial 
system with significant macroeconomic implications. Today, for example, households in the 
United States and a number of other countries seem likely to spend less, to save more, and 
to try to pay down debts. This seems likely to happen regardless of the capacity or incapacity 
of  the  financial  system  to  give  previous  borrowers  still  more  credit
33.  How  the  state  of 
household and corporate balance sheets affects the desire to spend (as opposed to the 
capacity to spend) is a crucial issue for future research.   
Viewing the issue as a broader macroeconomic problem, rather than the narrower problem  
of  “financial  stability”,  also  has  important  institutional  implications.  It  implies  that  the 
ultimate  responsibility  for  monitoring  the  buildup  of  these  kinds  of  imbalances,  and  for 
directing the policy response, falls more naturally into the realm of central banks than into 
the realm of financial supervisors. This currently creates a political problem, since it also 
appears that regulatory instruments, particularly ones that can be based on rules rather than 
discretion
34, seem currently to be the preferred policy response to the buildup of these kinds 
                                                           
30 White (2008) uses a global IS/LM model with a vertical real supply schedule to explain the unusual joint 
phenomena of very rapid growth, very low inflation and very low real interest rates earlier this decade. All 
three are explained by a positive supply side shift (due to globalization and other factors), a downward shift in 
the IS function (due to a collapse in investment and higher saving rates in Asia) and a resulting downward shift 
in the LM schedule (as central banks responded to the growing gap between aggregate demand and supply).  
31 Leijonhufvud has written extensively on what he calls the “corridor of stability”. The basic idea is that 
economies are stable and self equilibrating only within certain limits. Pushed beyond those limits, destabilizing 
tendencies predominate. See Leihonufvud (2009).  
32 For an overview of this work see Borio and Drehmann (2009) 
33 Koo (2008) contends that the length of the period of stagnation in Japan (beginning in the early 1990’s) was 
largely determined by the efforts of corporations to pay off debts. He further contends that the weakened 
state of the Japanese banking system played only a very limited role in explaining this phenomenon.    
34 Consider wide spread suggestions that banks use dynamic provisioning of the kind imposed in Spain, or that 
capital requirements under Basel 3 somehow be made countercyclical. See Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2009). The preference for rule based regimes seems to reflect the belief that discretionary 
“leaning against the wind” of credit bubbles will prove very difficult from both a technical and political 
perspective. See Brunnermeier et al (2009). 14 
   
of problems
35. Further research into these questions would be very welcome. In particular, 
the scope for monetary policy to “lean against the wind” of  rapid credit growth  should 
receive significant attention.
36   
To say that the problem is a broad macroeconomic problem is not to deny that it has a 
crucial financial component. Imbalances and excessive leverage in household and corporate 
balance sheets will generally be matched by excessive leverage on the part of financial firms. 
Indeed, it is the need to unwind both sets of leverage simultaneously that tends to make 
associated economic downturns so severe. This is particularly so since the effects of the non-
financial deleveraging on the economy will be amplified by Keynes’ “paradox of saving”, 
while  financial  deleveraging  will  be  impeded  by  what  Fisher  (1933)  described  as  the 
“paradox of deleveraging”. In short, if we are to follow up on the insights of Minsky, research 
into the functioning of the financial system remains a high priority.  
The current crisis has also led many to disavow most versions of efficient market theory, but 
what is to replace it?  Again, and fortunately, there already exists a body of finance literature 
on information deficiencies, network problems, flawed incentives and the like. The insights 
of behavioral finance are also being treated increasingly seriously, as are the contributions of 
market practitioners with particular insights into the interactions among participants that 
can generate unwarranted market outcomes
37. Recent advances in network theory and the 
theory of complex systems
38 could also prove useful, particularly  to the extent they might 
throw light on the robustness of the payments infrastructure (the “plumbing”) supporting 
the whole financial system.  
It  is  worth  noting  separately  one  example  of  market  inefficiency  that  is  likely  to  have 
particular implications for macroeconomic policies.  The Theory of Uncovered Interest Parity 
does  not  hold  except  over  quite  long  time  periods.
39  This  implies  that  interest  rate 
differentials  across  countries  can  induce  capital  flows  (“carry  trades”)  for  equally  long 
periods,  as  investors  tend  to  ignore  the  possibility  of  an  eventual  depreciation  of  the 
currency of the country receiving the capital inflows. For the monetary authority, this poses 
a potentially severe problem. Higher policy rates could potentially induce enough inflows, 
with associated implications for domestic credit conditions and the prices of longer term 
assets, to lead to an overall easing of financial conditions rather than the desired tightening. 
While it is tempting to think that this problem only applies to very small open economies, 
                                                           
35 This is the thrust of many official studies into the future of financial regulation. See the Paulsen Treasury 
report in the US, the report of the de Larosière group in Europe and the Turner report in the United Kingdom.  
36 On this see White (2009) 
37 For an example of the former, consider Akerlof and Schiller (2009) and, for the latter, Soros (2009) 
38 For a recent overview of this literature see Ramsden and Kervalishvili (2008) 
39 This is but one of many problems caused by what has been called “short-termism“in financial markets; 
namely, behavior which focuses on short term gain while ignoring longer term risks. Examples of such behavior 
would include the writing of longer term options to reap the benefit of a steady inflow of (inadequate) premia, 
and  making loans on the basis of collateral (subject to changes in value) rather than future cash flow.   15 
   
this may not in fact be true. Consider that, in the United States, monetary tightening at the 
end of the 1990’s and again after 2003 did not initially have the desired effects. As the dollar 
strengthened, equity prices rose and long bond rates fell.  For smaller countries at least, this 
phenomenon raises the shorter term issue of the need for capital controls. Longer term, it is 
also relevant to another question. If floating, in the context of free capital flows, amplifies 
the domestic credit cycle rather than moderating it, one of the main arguments for having a 
separate currency is called into question. 
As with the broader macro problems, new ways of thinking about financial problems can 
also have important institutional implications. No question is currently more important than 
the role of government safety nets.  In various ways, they have been expanding for decades, 
and we have just observed another massive step in that direction
40. The extent to which the 
growing  moral  hazard  (flawed  incentives,  noted  above)  associated  with  this  trend  has 
contributed to the growing severity of successive financial cycles is a topic that cries out for 
the  attention  of  researchers.
41  Current  concerns  that  banks  have  become  too 
big/complex/interrelated/to fail/ save/ are certainly warranted but only one aspect of this 
much bigger issue. 
Some Implications for Macroeconomic  Policy  
What  do  the  above  considerations  imply  for  macroeconomic  policy  in  normal 
circumstances?  The  most  important  implication  would be that  policy  should  be  focused 
much  more  on  avoiding  future  crises  arising  from  the  accumulation  over  time  of 
“imbalances” in both the real economy and the financial sector. This implies a multi period 
as  opposed  to  a  single  period  policy  horizon.  To  this  end,  we  need  to  institute  a  new 
framework for macrofinancial stability that would involve monetary, fiscal and regulatory 
policies leaning more systematically against the upswing of the credit cycle. Evidently, this 
would lead to a more symmetric application of such policies over the cycle. Moreover, it 
would  also  demand  more  overt  cooperation  between  the  various  arms  of  domestic 
governments  than  is  currently  the  case,  and  more  international  cooperation  among 
governments as well. These issues have been dealt with at length elsewhere, and need not 
be pursued further here.
42  
Closely related, policies directed to lowering the probability (and costs) of major crises would 
likely have to be more tolerant of minor downturns than hitherto
43. In a multi period world, 
                                                           
40 See Allesandri and Haldane (2009) 
41 On the possibility that successive bouts of monetary easing lead to a progressive reduction in the capacity of 
monetary policy to stimulate demand, see White (2006) and White (2009). Soros (2009) makes a very similar 
point in referring to the bursting of a “super bubble”.   
42 See in particular, White (2005) White (2009) and Hannoun (2010)  
43 Some might contend that this would be very difficult to do politically. While likely the case, note that the 
political authorities in many countries have already gone a long way down this road by giving “independent” 
central banks a mandate for keeping inflation low. Evidently, if the central bank’s tightening to avoid inflation is 16 
   
such downturns clearly have welcome therapeutic effects.  If big crises have their roots in 
wide spread debt problems, then recessions help prevent such buildups. Not only do they 
directly reduce debt levels through bankruptcies and debt workouts, but the threat of such 
an  outcome  leads  to  more  prudent  behavior  with  respect  to  debt  accumulation  (and 
leverage) in the cyclical upswing. Evidently, all bankruptcies have their downsides, but in 
relatively small numbers they are manageable. In contrast, widespread bankruptcies which 
threaten the stability of the financial system, or produce very large costs (via bailouts) for 
taxpayers, are inherently much more difficult to manage. Indeed, in the limit, where even 
the solvency of the government is called into question, the temptation to use the printing 
presses  to  paper  over  the  problem  could  prove  irresistible.  And,  since  only  unexpected 
inflation has this effect, the required increase in inflation could become very large
44. 
What do the above considerations imply for macroeconomic policy in current circumstances, where 
many countries are still deeply affected by the recent crisis? What policies would help to 
foster  a  global  recovery  on  a  sustainable  rather  than  only  a  temporary  basis?    The 
fundamental Keynesian insight, that raising aggregate demand is a high priority, will not be 
challenged in this paper
45. Yet, those who worry about side effects stretching beyond the 
current period would note two important implications. First, there should be a bias towards 
earlier “exit” policies to reduce the medium term costs. Second, forms of spending which 
actually increase imbalances are not sustainable and should not be relied upon.  
Concerning a bias to an earlier introduction of “exit” policies, the concerns in the case of 
fiscal policy are felt instinctively. After many decades of expansionary fiscal policies to fight 
recessions,  and  inadequate  tightening  in  upswings,  there  is  concern  in  many  Advanced 
Market Economies that  high debt to GNP ratios will cause financial markets to demand 
compensation.  This  could  exert  upward  pressure  on  longer  term  interest  rates
46  and 
downward pressure on the sovereign’s currency, leading in some cases to a stagflationary 
outcome.  In  response  to  such  concerns,  Ireland  and  Hungary,  among  others,  used 
discretionary fiscal tightening to offset major increases in deficits due to the operation of 
automatic stabilizers. Many other larger countries, like the United States and the United 
Kingdom, have been urged to prepare and present credible plans for stabilizing the public 
finances. Indeed, the recent European crisis (which began in Greece) has already caused a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
not perfectly  implemented (and it almost never is) recessions are implicitly accepted as being the cost paid to 
acheive price stability. 
44 Reference is made here only to the economic costs of deep slumps. Recall that Keynes, Hayek, Schumpeter 
and others in the1930’s worried as well about the social and political implications, not least threats to 
democracy and capitalism itself.    
45 Even Hayek was prepared to accept the usefulness of policies to stimulate aggregate demand in the case of 
what he called a “secondary depression”. By this he seemed to mean a cumulative downward process 
independent from the “maladjustments” that catalyzed it.  
46 Of course, higher interest rates increase  debt service requirements which makes the initial fears of non 
payment worse. See Checcetti et al (2010)  17 
   
number of European countries to slash deficits significantly in spite of already large negative 
output gaps.    
There  is  less  instinctive  understanding  of  the  undesirable  medium  term  effects  of  very 
expansionary monetary policies. The first worry is that such policies will prove effective only 
by  stimulating  a  “bubble”in  some  new  market  and  further  increases  in  leverage  and 
indebtedness. Indeed, as noted above, there are grounds for belief that we have been on 
such a path for many years
47. A second worry is that very easy monetary policy reduces 
growth potential in various ways. In particular, saving rates are reduced (affecting the capital 
stock over time) and “zombie” companies and banks are allowed to survive and (through 
competition effects) drag down the living with them
48. The subsequent effects on private 
sector investment, and reductions in aggregate demand, are referred to below. A third worry 
is  that  the  “search  for  yield”  will  strongly  encourage  imprudent  lending  and  the 
development of new instruments to hide risk
49. And finally, as noted above, there is the 
worry that extraordinarily easy monetary policies (various forms of quantitative and credit 
easing) might inadvertently culminate in rising inflation.    
Closely  related  would  be  concerns about the medium  term  effects  of  using  other  (non-
macro) policies to support the financial sector and the real economy. In most countries, 
government intervention to support the private financial sector has increased moral hazard 
but has not yet succeeded in clearly resolving existing problems. Moreover, mergers and 
acquisitions  in  many  countries  have  resulted  in  larger  banks,  further  consolidation  and 
increased  complexity.  All  of  this  has  made  the  “too  big  to  fail”  problem  worse
50,  again 
implying still greater problems ahead.  
As for support for the real economy, many countries (particularly in Europe) have introduced 
programs to encourage companies and workers to stay in their jobs on a part time basis. 
While this might help maintain income flows and spending, it could also (from an Austrian 
“malinvestment”perspective)  have  less  desirable  effects  over  a  longer  time  frame.  This 
would be particularly so if its effect was to impede necessary adjustments to production 
capacities. As Schumpeter once put it
51 
“Most  of  what  would  be  effective  in  remedying  a  depression  would  be  equally 
effective  in  preventing  this  adjustment.  This  is  especially  true  of  inflation  which 
                                                           
47 Since such a process must also prove unsustainable, the extensive and repeated use of such policies are not 
to be recommended. Unfortunately, however, the further down this path a monetary authority finds itself, the 
more apparent become the costs of trying to deviate from that path.  
48 For a fuller discussion see White (2005). On “zombies” in Japan, see Aherne and Shinada (2005) and Peek and 
Rosengreen (2003). They document how Japanese banks “evergreened” the loans of troubled firms, and how 
productivity growth suffered in industries containing such troubled firms.  
49 On the “risk taking channel” see Borio and Zhu (2008). On new instruments see Rajan (2005). 
50 By “too big to fail” is normally meant “too big/complex/interconnected to be allowed by governments to fail 
in a disorderly way”.  
51 Schumpeter (1934) p16 18 
   
would, if pushed far enough…….lead to a collapse worse than the one it was called in 
to remedy. “ 
To be still more concrete, “cars for clunkers” programs in countries with very low household 
saving rates are not optimal.  Nor are attempts to hold down exchange rates by countries 
with huge external trade surpluses. Nor are wage subsidies to support part time work, if jobs 
in the industries being supported (cars, construction, banking services etc.) will never fully 
recover. If felt necessary in the near term, a multiperiod perspective implies that countries 
should exit from such policies sooner rather than later.     
A second policy recommendation, suggested by a multiperiod perspective, would be to avoid 
encouraging forms of spending that actually increased imbalances. Looking in turn at the 
various components of aggregate global demand, there would seem to be little room to 
increase consumer spending and residential investment in many countries, not least the 
United States. Debt levels and the stocks of such goods are already uncomfortably high.  As 
for fixed investment, there would seem little room for this in China where investment is 
already an unprecedented 50 percent of GDP,
52 and where an added concern is that such 
investment will be directed towards the production of exports that could worsen global 
imbalances. As for government contributions to aggregate demand,  as just noted above, 
many countries now have deficits and debt levels that are already contributing to higher 
sovereign risk spreads or threaten to do so. These governments thus have little room for 
maneuver. Finally, for individual countries like the United States, demand could emanate 
from the external sector. However, this is of no net gain to the global economy as a whole. 
Other countries, most notably China, Germany and Japan, would by definition have to run 
smaller  external  surpluses.  In  short,  Keynesian  solutions  to  the  current  crisis  must  be 
“constrained Keynesian” solutions if they are to be sustainable.  
Taken  all  together,  the  above  observations  might  be  thought  to  constitute  a  council  of 
despair. In fact, this need not be the case.  Although adoption of a multi period perspective 
suggests that there are no quick fixes for our current difficulties, it also points towards other 
policies that could lead to a sustainable recovery over a rather longer time horizon.   
Perhaps  the  first  thing  to  recognize  is  that  not  all  global  spending  categories  are  debt 
constrained. In the emerging market economies, consumption levels are low, saving rates 
are high and consumer debt is not a domestic constraint. Since many of these countries 
(especially  China)  are  running  large  current  account  surpluses,  there  are  no  external 
constraints  either.  A  number  of  the  advanced  market  economies  (Germany,  Japan  and 
Switzerland for example) find themselves in a very similar external situation.  A global (G20) 
initiative to encourage a sustainable recovery should emphasize consumption spending in 
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investment decisions. There can be little doubt that China remains an emerging market economy with a capital 
stock that is still relatively small compared to its population.  19 
   
such countries. Structural reforms (of which more below) to encourage the production of 
domestic services in such countries would also be very welcome
53.  
There would also seem room for increases in private sector investments in many countries 
where investment levels have been low for many years. While private sector investment 
should always await the identification of profitable opportunities, such developments as 
demographic change and climate change would seem to offer such opportunities almost 
everywhere. As well, many countries with large trade deficits need more investment in the 
production  of  tradable  goods  and  services  to  allow  those  deficits  to  narrow  to  more 
sustainable levels.  
Governments could play a big role here, for better or for worse. Perhaps most importantly, 
private sector investment will not be stimulated by a political environment which is anti 
business. A number of authors have suggested that the depth and magnitude of the Great 
Depression in the United States, owed a great deal to such negative attitudes
54. Further, a 
climate  of  uncertainty  about  prospective  government  policies  would  also  inhibit  private 
investment. Finally, governments must allow a number of important prices that they (along 
with central banks) influence strongly to reflect market forces more faithfully.  
 As noted above, unnaturally low interest rates help to keep “zombie” companies and banks 
alive. The competition provided by such companies could be a direct major impediment to 
new private sector investment. As well, tolerating an unhealthy banking system raises the 
likelihood that it will be incapable of providing the financing needed for new investments. 
Small  and  medium  size  enterprises  that  traditionally  create  the  most  jobs  might  be 
particularly  hurt  by  such  a  shortfall.  Fewer  energy  subsidies
55  (particularly  in  emerging 
market economies) and energy prices that better reflected externalities (carbon taxes and 
“cap and trade” processes) would encourage investment consistent with resisting climate 
change. Reducing the various subsidies in China which encourage the manufacturing sector 
would encourage investment prospects elsewhere. So too would allowing exchange rates to 
move to reflect the buildup of global trade imbalances.  Entrepreneurs in countries with 
trade deficits have to be confident they will have market access to countries with trade 
surpluses
56.  Evidently,  concerns  about  protectionism  would  be  a  strong  influence  in  the 
opposite direction.  
Public sector investment would seem likely to have a high rate of return in many countries. 
In many emerging markets, a great deal of necessary infrastructure for growth is missing. In 
                                                           
53 This has been a long standing recommendation in chapters on structural issues in country reviews carried out 
by the Economic and Development Review Committee at the OECD. See as well Jones and Yoon (2008) 
54 See Powell (2003) and Smiley (2002) 
55 Recent estimates by the OECD indicate that almost $500 billion is spent on such subsidies each year 
worldwide. 
56 Higher exchange rates for surplus countries also encourage more consumption in such countries, even if 
lower exchange rates have the opposite effects in deficit countries.  20 
   
many advanced market economies, depreciation has taken a huge toll on old public sector 
investments implying the need for new programs. The suggestion that the recession might 
be over before these investments could be planned and executed does, of course, carry less 
weight for those who feel the “headwinds” of the imbalances will be blowing strongly for a 
long  time.  Of  course,  in  the  case  of  countries  with  large  existing  public  debts,  financial 
markets would still have to be convinced that the prospective government assets would 
yield more in terms of growth and tax revenues than the cost of financing them. Failing this, 
it might also be possible to raise tax revenues in ways that reduced private spending by less 
than the prospective increases in public sector spending
57.   
In addition to expanding spending where there are no debt constraints, attempts could be 
made to reduce the existing constraints on spending, thus improving spending prospects 
going forward.  In particular, a rapid writing off of the debts themselves, and the scrapping 
or reallocation of the assets purchased with borrowed money, would have many benefits.  
Evidently, orderly workouts designed to maintain value would be preferable to bankruptcies, 
but  in  many  cases  the  latter  might  be  inevitable.  Of  particular  importance  would  be 
reductions of consumer debt in the United States and other countries that had similarly 
overspent, and reductions of corporate debt in countries with export led growth strategies 
that  were  no  longer  sustainable.  Evidently,  such  efforts  would  also  have  important 
implications  for  private  sector  investment,  in  that  they  would  free  up  (and  make  less 
expensive) factors of production.   
In many countries, bankruptcy laws and workout procedures could be much improved, and 
greater effort should be put into developing the kind of practical expertise required to fully 
exploit  such  laws  and  procedures.  Evidently,  there  are  other  considerations  that  might 
constrain efforts in this area
58, but its importance should not be underestimated. There are 
many who contend that the lost decade in Japan was primarily due to a failure to grasp this 
particular nettle
59. 
Evidently, debt restructuring will have big implications for lenders as well as borrowers. In 
fact, fears about such implications could well constitute the single biggest constraint on a 
restructuring process. While much has been written on this, there seems general agreement 
that the approach taken by the Nordic countries to their problems of over indebtedness in 
                                                           
57 By way of example, the tax structure of the United States seems relatively inefficient. Higher property taxes, 
introduction of a VAT and other “sin” taxes, and the reduction of interest deductibility for corporate and 
households could raise major revenues and also have other benefits. These would include more work and more 
saving. A reduction in the corporate tax rate and the double taxation of profits, offset by lower interest rate 
deductions, would also encourage more investment and greater reliance on equity rather than corporate debt. 
58 In the US, there are millions of households in difficulty and even the US does not have the infrastructure to 
cope with this. Further, much mortgage debt is encumbered by “silent second” mortgages and by being 
wrapped up in structured products where restructuring of the underlying asset is not allowed. See Ellis (2008).    
In China, much investment has been carried out by State Owned Enterprises and sub national levels of 
government. The politics of “writeoffs” in such circumstances would be an enormous impediment to action.   
59 See the references above to “zombie” companies. As well, see Toyama and Sato (2007) and Nakamae (2010) 21 
   
the  early  1990’s  had  much  to recommend  it.  In  particular, the  state guaranteed  all  the 
liabilities  of  the  banks,  and  put  the  restructuring  decisions  in  the  hands  of  technicians 
completely  independent  of  the  political  process.  The  fact  that  the  respective  Nordic 
governments had the full support of all the other political parties provided a guarantee of 
“finality”  that  helped  the  process  materially.  Unlike  the  Japanese,  the  Nordic  countries 
resumed rapid growth after only a few years of deep recession and that stellar performance 
was maintained until the global crisis intervened in the middle of 2008.  
This Nordic experience shows that it is possible to resolve debt problems, even those big 
enough  to  threaten  the  whole  banking  system.  Whether  other  governments  and  other 
political systems would be capable of such resolute action remains to be seen. The fact that 
the  inter  linkages  between  financial  agents  have  become  much  more  complex  and 
nontransparent in recent years is a further significant impediment to confronting this issue 
head on
60. So too is aggressive lobbying by financial sector interests in favor of the status 
quo. At the least, their argument that more aggressive official polices will slow economic 
recovery needs to be confronted with the facts of the Nordic experience. 
 
A Methodological Postscript  
When it comes to macroeconomic theory, the current crisis has highlighted what appear to 
be some serious shortcomings of prevailing modes of thought. At the same time, it has also 
raised the prospect of other strands of thought with important implications for policy. A 
multi period perspective, recognizing the procyclical interactions over time between the real 
sector and the financial sector, can improve polices directed to both crisis prevention and 
crisis management. Perhaps most important, it provides some guidance as to how policy can 
be used in the current crisis to prepare the way for a more sustainable global economic 
rebound.  Whether  such  suggestions  will  prompt  research  work  leading  to  an  eventual 
“paradigm  shift”  remains  to  be  seen.  But,  however  we  label  it,  a  change  in  how  most 
economists think about macroeconomic processes would seem highly desirable.   
A corollary thought is that the complexity of the interacting influences on the economy will 
likely never be amenable to rigorous mathematical proof. Macroeconomics is not a science, 
regardless of how many economists who would like to believe that it is. We must then be 
ready to accept other kinds of “proof” (not least the evidence drawn from history), perhaps 
along the lines suggested a number of years ago by McClosky (1985). And, as a further 
corollary,  policymakers  might  be  well  advised  to  replace  their  current  “maximizing” 
                                                           
60 The so called” Volcker” plan to force banks to stop proprietary trading has been criticized on the grounds 
that proprietary trading was not at the heart of current problems in the financial sector.  This criticism misses 
the point. Such trading is at the heart of the inter linkages and complexities which made the official sector so 
fearful of either letting banks fail or nationalizing them outright.    22 
   
strategies with their “minimax” equivalents. Given our current degree of ignorance about 
how the macro economy actually works, a philosophy of “do no harm” would seem to have 
much  to  recommend  it.  In  that  sense,  perhaps,  economists  would  do  much  better  to 
emulate doctors rather than dentists.
61 
                                                           
61 Keynes once said “If economists could manage to get themselves thought of as humble, competent people 
on a level with dentists, that would be splendid.” In contrast, doctors (like the ancient Greeks taking the 
Hippocratic oath) pledge to “do no harm”. This would seem even more welcome, being an even less ambitious 
objective.  23 
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